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Abstract—ansomware is one kind of malware using cryptog-
raphy to prevent victims from normal use of their computers.
As a result, victims lose the access to their files and desktops
unless they pay the ransom to the attackers. By the end of 2019,
ransomware attack had caused more than 10 billion dollars of
financial loss to enterprises and individuals. In this work, we
propose a Network-Assisted Approach (NAA), which contains
local detection and network-level detection, to help user determine
whether a machine has been infected by ransomware. To evaluate
its performance, we built 100 containers in Docker to simulate
network scenarios. A hybrid ransomware sample which is close
to real-world ransomware is deployed on stimulative infected
machines. The experiment results show that our network-level
detection mechanisms are separately applicable to WAN and LAN
scenarios for ransomware detection.ansomware is one kind of
malware using cryptography to prevent victims from normal use
of their computers. As a result, victims lose the access to their
files and desktops unless they pay the ransom to the attackers.
By the end of 2019, ransomware attack had caused more than
10 billion dollars of financial loss to enterprises and individuals.
In this work, we propose a Network-Assisted Approach (NAA),
which contains local detection and network-level detection, to
help user determine whether a machine has been infected by
ransomware. To evaluate its performance, we built 100 containers
in Docker to simulate network scenarios. A hybrid ransomware
sample which is close to real-world ransomware is deployed on
stimulative infected machines. The experiment results show that
our network-level detection mechanisms are separately applicable
to WAN and LAN scenarios for ransomware detection.R
I. INTRODUCTION
Ransomware is a type of malware which blocks computer
users access to their data or systems by encrypting important
files in computers. Victims have to pay the requested ransom to
get decryption keys from the attackers so that they can recover
their data and systems. Sometimes the files cannot be recovered
even if ransom is paid either because by accident the victim
destroys the file which contains decryption key or because the
attacker breaks promise. Since ransomware attack is easy to
implement and attackers can extort a large amount of money
once it succeeds, a lot of ransomware have emerged in recent
years and caused huge losses worldwide.
Here are some examples of ransomware attacks. Petya [29]
is a family of ransomware first discovered in March 2016. It
targeted Microsoft Windows-based systems and encrypted a hard
drives file system table to prevent the system from booting.
Victims had to pay the ransom in Bitcoin in order to regain
access to the system. In June 2017, a derivative of Petya called
NotPetya [29] launched a global attack on Microsoft Windows
systems again via EternalBlue exploits and totally caused more
than 10 billion dollars financial losses. In October 2017, a new
ransomware attack named Bad Rabbit [1] was discovered in
Russia and Ukraine, which follows a similar pattern to Petya.
It encrypted the Windows user’s file tables and then demanded a
Bitcoin payment to decrypt them. Some researchers believed that
Bad Rabbit had been distributed due to a bogus update to Adobe
Flash software. At that time, a lot of agencies were affected by this
ransomware including Interfax, Odessa International Airport,
Kiev Metro and the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine.
In 2018 and 2019, ransomware still played an important role
in malware family and exerted a significant impact on global
computer users, especially Microsoft Windows operating system
users. GrandGrab, Hermes2.1, Ryuk, Scarab, LockerGoga, etc.
are all ransomware emerged during these two years targeting
at Microsoft Windows since this system is the most common
operating system used by enterprises and organizations that
are potential blackmail objects for whom large ransoms are
affordable.
As Linux operating system becomes increasingly popular
in recent years and more businesses than ever are running
on Linux now, Linux-oriented ransomware have sprung up to
attack Linux users for exorbitant profits. In 2017, KillDisk [2]
ransomware encrypted files, demanded bitcoin ransoms and left
Linux systems unbootable. Erebus [3] ransomware affected about
3400 of NAYANAs clients via malware-containing advertisements.
In 2019, Lilocked [4] ransomware targeted Linux servers and
gain root access to encrypt the files with extensions such as PHP,
HTML, CSS, etc. The victims were guided to dark web to make
a payment in bitcoin in order to recover their files. The mech-
anism behind this ransomware is still a secret, researchers are
looking out for a sample to discover the solution for decrypting
affected files. Compared with ransomware targeted for Microsoft
Windows operating system, Linux-oriented ransomware have
not made a huge impact on enterprises and individuals up to
now. However, this situation could change in the near future
because the ransomware makers are always driven by profits. It
is inevitable that more companies and individuals in industry will
adopt Linux system due to its security, stability and open-source-
ness, which will lead to the generation of many ransomware
targeted at Linux operating system.
Among all types of ransomware in ransomware family,
cryptoworm is one of the most troublesome genre. It spreads
in the form of a worm, which means it can replicate itself and
spread to other computers. Thus, cryptoworm can produce more
serious consequence than other kinds of ransomware from the
overall point of view once it is successfully designed and put into
use by attackers. WannaCry [30] is an example of cryptoworm
which broke out in May 2017. It used EternalBlue exploits to
gain accesses to Microsoft Windows operating systems. As soon
as the cryptoworm infected a computer, it encrypted data on
the computer and later extorted Bitcoin cryptocurrency from
the victim. Many organization systems were infected and helped
spread WannaCry at that time because those systems did not
apply newest patches released by Microsoft. This attack affected
about 200,000 computers across 150 countries and resulted in
total damages ranging from hundreds of millions to billions of
dollars.
Since ransomware attacks emerge in endlessly, people all
around the world is suffering from unanticipated threats to their
property. To help individuals and collectives to get rid of this
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kind of financial loss, ransomware detection is an indispensable
topic in study.
To mitigate the damage of ransomware attacks especially
cryptoworm attacks, we proposed a Network-Assisted Approach
(NAA) for ransomware detection, which combines local detection
and network-level detection that successively give user a local
report and a comprehensive report about respective detection
result. The comprehensive detection report uses wisdom of the
crowd to help computer users determine whether they are
undergoing a ransomware attack so that they can take actions
timely and avoid ransomware extortion.
We designed a local detection algorithm that is applicable on
all kinds of operating systems and implemented a local detection
mechanism prototype targeted at Linux system. In the local
detection algorithm, we considered three features displayed on
local hosts, among which there is a brand new feature never
been used by previous works to the best of our knowledge, to
generate a local report in an accurate and instant manner.
As for network-level detection, we adapted ant colony opti-
mization algorithm to our problem and implemented an ACO-
based Mechanism (ACOM) which sufficiently collects information
from other machines so that a comprehensive report can be
generated to help user determine whether the local host is
attacked by ransomware or not. We also implemented a simple
method named Broadcasting Mechanism (BM) which exhaus-
tively collects information and used wisdom of the crowd to
help user determine current safety state. These two network-level
detection mechanisms are separately suitable for ransomware
detection in WAN and LAN.
To estimate the performance of NAA, we established 100
containers in Docker and applied a Linux ransomware sample
GonnaCry to simulative infected containers to mimic network
scenarios. Then, we launched NAA in each container to achieve
the evaluation of accuracy, message overheads and latency.
The main contributions of this paper are:
(1) Propose a ransomware detection approach NAA es-
pecially targets at cryptoworm, which combines local
detection and network-level detection to generate a
report for user’s reference.
(2) Present a local detection algorithm applicable to all
operating systems and implement a prototype on Linux
system.
(3) Apply ACO algorithm to network-level detection to im-
plement a sufficient and reliable network-level detection
mechanism ACOM to collect information from network.
(4) Build a network scenario by establishing 100 containers
in Docker and launching a ransomware sample on sim-
ulative infected machines to estimate the performance
of NAA.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
describes the background knowledge of both ransomware and
ransomware detection approaches; Section 3 explains our moti-
vations and generalizes the outline of NAA; Section 4 describes
the design and implementation of our local detection mechanism;
Section 5 describes the details of ACOM and BM; Section 6
evaluates NAA’s performance from accuracy, message overheads
and latency; Section 7 concludes the paper and discusses future
work.
II. RELATED WORK
Cryptographic ransomware is also called crypto ransomware,
which always encrypts user files and then extorts users for
cryptocurrencies before providing the decryption key. It is favored
by attackers because digital currencies such as Ukash or Bitcoin
and other cryptocurrency provide strong anonymity, making it
difficult to trace and prosecute the perpetrators based on ransom
payment transactions. Previous works on ransomware detection
mainly focused on checking the features that are displayed due to
ransomware behaviors on local hosts. And, they were designed for
Microsoft Windows operating system because Windows is more
vulnerable and is the target of most crypto ransomware.
In 2015, Ahmadian et al. [9] proposed a comprehensive
ransomware taxonomy and presented a connection monitor and
connection breaker technique for detecting highly survivable
ransomwares in the key exchange protocol step. In 2016, Paik
et al. [23] proposed a storage-level detection method, which
detects the existence of ransomware based on storage-access
activities, e.g., number of files accessed and read/write frequency.
Scaife et al. [25] presented an early-warning detection system
that alerts users during suspicious file activity using a set of
behavior indicators like entropy, file differences, magic bytes and
read/write frequency. K. Cabaj et al. [12] analyzed the behavior of
a popular ransomware named CryptoWall and proposed two real-
time mitigation methods using SDN-based algorithm. C. Moore
[20] investigated ransomware detection methods that implement
canary files to monitor changes under folders and ascertained that
canary files offer limited value as there is no way to influence
the ransomware to access the folder containing monitored files.
Sgandurra et al. [26] presented a machine learning approach
for dynamically analyzing and classifying ransomware. It mon-
itors application behaviors and checks characteristic signs of
ransomware including file extension, read/write frequency and
function calls.
In 2017, Y. Feng et al. [16] proposed a new approach
based on deception and behavior monitoring to detect crypto
ransomware with no loss. Their approach creates decoy files
and makes ransomware operate on decoy files firstly, and then
monitor the decoy files by checking whether they are encrypted
by ransomware through the comparison of Shannon entropy,
file type and sdhash between original files and changed files.
Chadha et al. [13] discussed several machine learning algorithms
for discovering DGA domains and analyzed their performance.
Kirda et al. [18] presented a dynamic analysis system which
automatically generates an artificial environment and detects
when ransomware interacts with user data. In their system,
entropy, removed files and read/write frequency are considered as
monitor objects. Chen et al. [15] monitored the actual behaviors
of software to generate API call flow graphs and used data
mining techniques to build a detection model for decide whether
the software is benign or is a ransomware. Kharraz et al. [17]
proposed a defense approach which maintains a transparent
buffer for all storage I/O and then monitors the I/O request
patterns of applications on a per-process basis for signs of
ransomware-like behaviors including entropy, removed files, file
extension and read/write frequency.
In 2018, Khashif et al. [28] presented a hybrid approach that
combined static and dynamic analysis to generate a set of features
that characterizes the ransomware behavior. This approach ana-
lyzes software binary code first, and then checks entropy, canary
files, read/write frequency and function calls. Alaam et al. [10]
presented a detection tool which uses artificial neutral network
and Fast Fourier Transformation (FFT) to develop a solution
to ransomware detection by checking functions and frequency.
Quinkert et al. [24] presented a defense system that learns
features of malicious domains by observing the domains involved
in known ransomware attacks and then monitors newly registered
domains to identify potentially malicious ones. Moussaileb et
al. [22] presented a graph-based ransomware countermeasure
which uses per-thread file system to highlight the malicious
behaviors such as modification of canary files and accesses to
large number of directories in a small time period. Morato et al.
[21] proposed an algorithm that can detect ransomware action
over shared documents by applying a network traffic inspection
device between local users and shared volumes. The inspection
device extracts SMB protocol commands through every access
to the shared volumes it monitored and analyzes SMB traffic
to determine whether the network volumes shared using SMB
protocol is attacked by ransomware or not.
In 2019, A. O. Almashhadani et al. [11] demonstrated a com-
prehensive behavioral analysis of crypto ransomware network
activities including DGA, SMB traffic and general traffic for
detection of ransomware. Lee et al. [19] proposed a method
that utilizes an entropy technique to measure a characteristic
of the encrypted files. Machine learning is applied for classifying
infected-files-based file entropy analysis.
The above literature covers almost all features that character-
izes the ransomware behaviors. Our local detection mechanism
also uses some of this kind of features to help determine whether
a local host is a suspicious victim or not whereas a brand
new feature ”read/write pattern” is considered as well to help
make accurate diagnosis on local hosts. Moreover, our approach
contains network-level detection to offer more accurate detection
results. While the papers mentioned above designed defense
methods for Windows system, our prototype of the local detection
mechanism targets at Linux system which is the next popular
attack object of ransomware attacks although our approach
is applicable on both Windows system and Linux system. We
can easily derive a Windows version using the same design but
different system libraries and tools.
III. OUR NETWORK-ASSISTED APPROACH
A. Background Knowledge
1) Characteristics of Ransomware Behaviors: Ransomware
attacks always access victims operating system in some way and
encrypt a large number of user files or system files or both
automatically in a short time. During this process, the infected
system performs differently from what it should be when there
is no ransomware attack. This common trace provides various
kinds of useful information that can be extracted from a suspected
victim when a ransomware is running. Although there are some
differences on key generation and key preservation strategies
among different ransomware, we can still conclude the following
common features that show so obvious distinctions between safe
and infected circumstances that can be used for ransomware
detection.
(1) Keywords
If a software is a ransomware, it probably contains
some keywords that are commonly used in ransomware
binaries. For example, bitcoin, crypto, ransom, etc.
are common strings frequently appear in ransomware
binaries. By inspecting software binaries, we can figure
out some suspicious software even before ransomware
attack happens.
(2) Function Calls
Since ransomware needs to encrypt files, it always calls
functions related to cryptographic algorithms, including
key generation, encryption and decryption functions.
These functions may be written by the attacker or
invoked from existing libraries. We can inspect binaries
to locate the software that call these functions.
(3) Data Information
Once a file is encrypted, we can observe some changes on
this file. The file extension may be modified to a specific
extension designated by the ransomware. The entropy
of the file increases due to the randomness of data after
encryption. The magic bytes of this file are different
from original bytes because they are encrypted. Some
files are even deleted since the ransomware created new
files to store encrypted versions. All of these features
provide useful information for ransomware detection.
(4) Metadata Information
Metadata information refers to some indirect informa-
tion we can collect during ransomware attacks instead
of information from file contents. Ransomware is an
automatic program that encrypts a large number of files
in a very short time in most cases due to super-fast com-
putation speed of computers. So, when a ransomware
is working, it accesses many files and directories, and
then performs read and write operations on these files in
short time periods, which leads to high file/directory ac-
cess rate and high read/write frequency on a computer.
This phenomenon also indicates a potential ransomware
attack.
(5) Network Traffic
Some ransomware generate and store their keys on
a remote server so that victims cannot figure out
decryption keys without paying ransom. As for this kind
of ransomware, it must contact the remote server to get
encryption key during the attack. Thus, an unknown
network traffic that is not produced by the user of the
local host can be inspected, which helps ransomware
detection.
All these features listed above can be used to judge if the
computer is in abnormal conditions and thus help determine
whether there is ransomware working on this computer. However,
one feature alone in consideration is insufficient for accurate
detection results. So, most detection approaches pick several
features and combine their checking results together to decide
whether to alert user ransomware attack or not.
2) Wisdom of the Crowd: The wisdom of the crowd [31]
is a collective opinion produced by a group of people instead
of an individual. Some experiments showed that the collective
knowledge of ordinary people is more precise than that of
an expert. The reason for this phenomenon is that there is
idiosyncratic noise associated with each individual judgment, and
taking the average over a large number of responses will go some
way toward canceling the effect of this noise. Thus, this notion
has been applied to many social information sites such as Quora,
Wikipedia and Yahoo! Answers.
For high accuracy of ransomware detection results, we also
use wisdom of the crowd in network-level detection of NAA to
generate a comprehensive report for users to reference and to
determine whether they need to do further actions to deal with
potential ransomware attacks.
B. Our Motivation
As we can observe in ransomware attack cases, majority of
ransomware have this property: Their appearance and diffusion
are related to network. If one machine is infected by some
ransomware, the others in the same local area network (LAN)
are potential victims. That is because LAN is deployed by entities
such as enterprises, laboratories and schools to interconnect
computers within a small area. Computers in one LAN are
often equipped with the same operating system and the same
version. So, if a computer is attacked by ransomware via
some exploit, the others are possibly attacked or going to be
attacked because they share the same vulnerability. Worse, if
the ransomware is a cryptoworm that actively scans the local
network to compromise other machines, those computers in the
same LAN are hence under high risk. Even if in a wild area
network (WAN), cryptoworm can spread in high speed because
it is self-propagating, which means one infected computer can
infect almost all computers communicated with it and result in
fast increase of infected computers.
So, network related information that is corresponding to
the conditions of other computers in network is very useful
in ransomware detection especially in cryptoworm detection.
However, existing approaches for ransomware detection only
consider the characteristics of ransomware behaviors on local
hosts as the parameters of their detection tools. One exception
is the work [21] that analyzes file sharing traffic in a volume
sharing scenario to detect possible ransomware. However, this
work still did not have an eye on the security information of
other computers in network.
Motivated by the above observations, we propose a network-
assisted approach which contains both local detection and
network-level detection. Local detection is responsible for check-
ing local features of a machine to make a preliminary diagnosis
whereas network-level detection collects security conditions of
other machines in a specific area to help determine whether
the local host is infected or not. Since one machine can be
in both LAN and WAN, our network-level detection has two
separate schemes for these two scenarios. To achieve security
conditions of other machines from WAN, we design an ACO-
based Mechanism (ACOM), which uses ant colony optimization
algorithm to efficiently collect maximum amount of information
with minimum network resource consumption and report its
detection result to the user. To obtain desired information from
LAN, we design Broadcasting Mechanism (BM). It directly
collects information of all machines in LAN and uses wisdom of
the crowd to report a comprehensive detection result. With the
information provided by ACOM and BM, NAA can accurately
detect ransomware especially cryptoworm and help user judge
whether the local host is infected or not.
C. Outline of NAA
NAA is a ransomware detection application that does both
local detection and network-level detection. The local detection
checks local features while the network-level detection collects
security conditions of other machines from network to provide
information for user to judgement whether the local host is
attacked or not. Figure 1 shows the workflow of NAA.
First of all, we run the local detection mechanism on each
local host. If the local detection mechanism finds anomalous tasks,
it suspends them using kill -STOP pid command and accordingly
raises an alert to the end user. Then, based on his knowledge, the
user should respond to NAA whether the anomalous behaviors
are caused by a legitimate user operation or not (e.g., when the
user is encrypting files with a special tool). If they are, NAA
will resume the suspended processes using ”kill -CONT pid”
command and continue to do local detection. If the user indicates
these behaviors are anomalous (either because they are truly
anomalous or because the user has no idea on what is going on),
network-level detection should be launched. During the process
of network-level detection, ACOM is responsible for collecting
information from WAN and BM is responsible for collecting
information from LAN. Once both mechanisms finish their work,
a comprehensive report will be sent to the user describing the
current network-wide situation. Then, the user can get an idea
on the fraction of computers in the LAN that are also in the
anomalous state and how ACOM views about the current state
of this local host. Based on such given information, the user can
Fig. 1. Workflow of NAA.
make a judgement about whether this local host is in danger. If
the answer is yes, NAA finishes its work; otherwise, the computer
is considered safe and NAA will resume the suspended tasks and
continue with local detection.
In the following sections, we will explain how local detection
and network-level detection work and generate reports in detail.
IV. LOCAL DETECTION
A. Design of Local Detection Algorithm
Review that local detection checks some common features on
local hosts which always display different characteristics under
safe condition and infected condition. Section 3.1 introduced
characteristics of ransomware behaviors and listed the features
that could be considered in local detection.
In our local detection algorithm, we pick entropy, read/write
frequency and read/write pattern as input parameters to diagnose
the local host because the combination of these three parameters
provides both high accuracy and efficiency. Among them, entropy
and read/write frequency are classic features used by previous
methods while read/write pattern is a brand new feature firstly
proposed by this paper.
Entropy is the measurement of the randomness originally
used in thermodynamics. In 1984, Claude E. Shannon applied
entropy to digital communications in his paper A Mathematical
Theory of Communication [27]. After that, people started to use
entropy to describe the extent of the randomness of a digital
file. Encrypted files and compressed files tend to have higher
entropy than normal files because the bytes in encrypted files
and compressed files are more random. So, we can use entropy to
help us determine if a file is in normal condition or not. However,
even if we can find files with high entropy in a system, we cannot
deem that this system is infected by ransomware because there
are two exceptions: 1) The files with high entropy are compressed
files instead of encrypted files. 2) The files are encrypted files, but
they are encrypted by authorized users. Thus, this feature alone
is not sufficient to produce an accurate ransomware detection
result. We use further features to help us make more accurate
judgements.
Read/write frequency describes the frequency of read and
write operations on a machine. Ransomware always encrypts
many files in a short time because they do not want to be detected
before they finish work. Moreover, they want to encrypt as many
files as possible so that the attackers are more likely to get ransom
from the victim. We all know that file encryption task is related
to read and write operations. So, if a ransomware is working,
we can probably observe high read and write frequencies on a
system. However, we still cannot make accurate diagnosis about
whether a system is a potential victim or not with these two
features because there are still some exceptions such as batch file
compression. It has the same behaviors as ransomware attack
when only considering entropy and read/write frequency.
To distinguish the behaviors of ransomware attack and other
normal behaviors that also result in high file entropy and high
read/write frequency such as batch file compression, we take
read/write patterns as the third feature since different tasks
usually have different read/write patterns. To our best knowledge,
this feature has not been used in prior work. We use it to
distinguish user’s normal behaviors from ransomware activities.
Here read/write patterns refer to the relationship between read
and write operations occurred on a system. For example, if there
is a read operation right after a write operation, we can use
{write, read} to describe their relation during this period. If
there is a read operation before write operation, but between
them exists a close operation, we can use {read, ..., write} to
describe the read/write pattern in this scenario which means
there exist(s) other operation(s) between read and write. When
ransomware is encrypting a file, it always reads the original
file first and writes the ciphertext into a new created file.
Then, the original file is deleted so that only encrypted file left.
Ransomware encrypts files one after another, which makes read
and write operations pairs appear at intervals. So, the pattern
of ransomware activity can be concluded as {read, write}. In
contrast, batch file compression task continuously reads each file
in a specified directory and finally writes compressed texts into
the compressed file after closing these original files. There is no
adjacent read and write operations in its pattern. Other tasks also
have their own read/write patterns that are usually different from
those of ransomware activities. Thus, read/write patterns can help
us filter out some benign behaviors when detecting ransomware
attacks.
Our local detection algorithm comprehensively considers
these three features to make a conclusion about whether the
local host is anomalous or not. This algorithm is applicable to
all operating systems because no matter what kind of operating
system the ransomware is working on, it has common behaviors
which will cause common characteristics. In our implementation,
we used this algorithm to build a local detection mechanism
prototype for Linux system as an example.
B. Implementation of Local Detection Mechanism
This subsection describes the outline and details of the local
detection mechanism which is implemented to support network-
level detection methods. Since the local detection algorithm
described in Section 4.1 is applicable to any operating system, we
selected Linux system as an example to implement a prototype.
1) Overview: As we already known, all ransomware encrypt
files to extort victims. Thus, all ransomware activities are related
to operations on file system. To monitor the related operations
on Linux file system, we use a tool called inotify [5] which is a
Linux kernel subsystem that can monitor file system events and
report changes. Inotify events include IN OPEN, IN ACCESS,
IN MODIFY, IN DELETE and etc., among which IN ACCESS
indicates read operation and IN MODIFY indicates write oper-
ation. We can use several system calls provided by the inotify
API to monitor a specified directory. To monitor the entire file
system, we can use ”/.” as the directory name to be monitored
which represents the root directory of Linux file system. Once
inotify starts to work, all events occurred in the directory tree
can be captured and an event handler defined by us will deal
with these events following detection requirements.
Our local detection mechanism prototype utilizes inotify
to monitor Linux file system and combines altogether three
features mentioned in Section 4.1 (entropy, read/write frequen-
cies, read/write patterns) to measure whether the local host is
anomalous or not. Figure 2 shows the workflow of the local
detection mechanism.
Fig. 2. Workflow of local detection mechanism.
At the very beginning, we add a watch to the root directory so
that we can monitor the entire file system. Then, start inotify. We
first check read/write patterns because it can be done instantly
when a new event is monitored. If there is a pattern matching with
anomalous pattern, that is, the checking result of the first module
is ”anomalous”, start a new thread to do further detection. This
pattern checking module keeps working no matter what the result
is because inotify keeps monitoring the file system and we dont
want to miss any possibly upcoming anomalous patterns. When
we start the new thread, we also pass the path of the file where
the anomalous write operation happened.
The new thread works on checking the other features. It first
checks file entropy of the potentially encrypted file whose path
was passed by the pattern checking module when the new thread
was created. If the file entropy is too high to be normal, that is,
the checking result of the second module is ”anomalous”, go to
the next module to check read/write frequency. Otherwise, the
new thread stops because the local host is currently in safe state.
Our reason for this judgement is that, the modified file, where
the anomalous pattern is discovered, has normal entropy value
which means it is not encrypted. This phenomenon is impossible
to occur if the local host is undergoing a ransomware attack.
In the third module, we check read/write frequency. If current
read/write frequency on this system is too high to be normal, that
is, the checking result of the third module is ”anomalous”, the
local detection mechanism can make a diagnosis that this machine
is anomalous because it shows anomalous characteristics in all
three aspects. Otherwise, stop the new thread because the local
host is safe. Note that, the local host has an initial state: safe. If
the local detection mechanism cannot find the proof to confirm
this machine is in anomalous state, we consider it is safe by
default.
The rest of this subsection elaborates on how each module is
implemented.
2) Check Read/Write Patterns: According to the work proce-
dure of common ransomware, we know that ransomware always
automatically encrypt files one after another. As for each file, the
encryption task consists of several file operations: (1) Open the
original file; (2) Create a new file; (3) Open the new file; (4) Read
plaintext from the original file; (5) Write ciphertext in the new
file; (6) Close the original file; (7) Close the new file; (8) Delete
the original file. During this process, we can observe adjacent
read and write operations with read before write. To distinguish
read/write patterns of file encryption task with that of other tasks,
we also observed the read/write patterns of some common user
behaviors. By adding a watch to a particular directory, we can
observe the events in this directory.
Table I lists file operations during file encryption and other
normal tasks. According to this table, we can find that the
read/write pattern of file encryption task is {read, write} which
indicates a single pair of read and write operations with read
before write. This {read, write} pair can appear many times,
but other operations exist between two adjacent pairs. File
modification and compression tasks have the following read/write
pattern, {read, ..., write}, which means some other operations
between read and write operations. When we decompress a
file, only read operation occurs. The most confusing task is
browsing a webpage, because it has similar read/write patterns
as file encryption. When we browse a webpage, we can observe
adjacent read and write operations as well. However, there exists
continuous read operations before a write operation or iterative
read/write pairs. So, we mark the read/write patterns of browsing
a webpage as {read*, write} and {read, write}*, which are
different from the read/write pattern of file encryption task.
Thus, we consider {read, write} as an anomalous read/write
pattern indicating file encryption activities. Only when there is a
read operation right before a write operation and before them are
other file operations, we can say we find an anomalous pattern.
We set a judgement condition that if there exists {read, write} on
a monitored system, the local host is potentially in risk, further
diagnosis is in need. Otherwise, the local host is safe. Since inotify
monitors the entire file system in the implementation of our local
detection mechanism, we admit that sometimes some operations
from different tasks may mix together. That is, inotify may
capture an operation from task A after an operation from task
B but before another operation from task B, which may generate
anomalous pattern while there is no anomalous behaviors. In this
case, this pattern checking module causes false positives, that is
why we need further diagnosis to check other features.
To be aware of the anomalous read/write patterns in time, we
customize the inotify event handler in the following way: record
all monitored events in order in an event list; once coming across
a write operation, check the last two operations in event list. If
the last one is read as well as the last-second one is neither read
nor write, the anomalous read/write pattern is found; otherwise,
empty the event list and continue to add monitored events into
the list. Figure 3 shows the code of our event handler.
Once an anomalous read/write pattern {read, write} is
discovered on a system, the checking result of the first module
is ”anomalous”. So, we should start a new thread to do further
diagnosis and pass the path of the file where this anomalous write
operation happened to the new thread so that the second module
can directly locate the file it needs to check.
3) Check File Entropy: There is an existing algorithm for file
entropy calculation [6]. Given a file, this algorithm traverses the
target file to get the frequency count of each byte value and then
Fig. 3. Event handler for local detection.
uses the following formula to cumulatively calculate the entropy
of the entire file.
entropy = entropy + freq ∗ log2 freq (1)
Here, the variable ”entropy” is initialized to 0 and gradually
increases until all ”freq” related values are included, the variable
”freq” represents the frequency of each byte value. With this
algorithm, we can easily calculate final entropy value for a target
file.
To distinguish normal files and encrypted files through file
entropy, we launched an experiment to calculate the entropy
values of various kinds of normal files and encrypted files. Table II
lists the entropy values of many different types of files in normal
state and encrypted state.
We can observe from Table II that text files which consist of
English words have relatively low entropy in normal state. The
entropy of this kind of normal files ranges from 4.0 to 5.0 while
that of their corresponding encrypted files ranges from 7.0 to 8.0
in Linux file system. As for other types of files such like pictures
and audios, they have relatively high entropy even in normal
state. After being encrypted, their entropy values are tend to be
8. So, we deal with different kinds of files in different ways. As
for a text file, we set the threshold 6.00. As for an non-text file,
the threshold is set to be 7.99. Then, we can determine whether
a file is anomalous or not by checking its entropy.
First, we check file extension of the target file. If the file
extension is out of our knowledge, this file must be encrypted by
ransomware because ransomware always modify file extension
after encrypting a file. If we can recognize the file extension,
calculate file entropy and compare entropy value with appropriate
threshold value. If the entropy of the inspected file is greater
than or equal to the threshold value, this file is considered to
have an anomalous entropy value. That is, the checking result
of the second module is ”anomalous”. Then, the third feature
”read/write frequency” should be checked for final detection
result. Otherwise, this is not an encrypted file, hence not a
ransomware attack.
Tasks File operations Read/write patterns
Encrypt a file open, create, open, read, write, close, close, delete. {read, write}
Modify a file open, read, close, open, create, open, close, write, close. {read, ..., write}
Compress a file open, create, open, read, close, write, close. {read, ..., write}
Decompress a file open, read, close. {read}
Browse a webpage 1 create, open, write, close, read, ..., read, write. {read*, write}
Browse a webpage 2 ..., read, write, read, write, ..., read, write. {read, write}*
TABLE I. READ/WRITE PATTERNS OF DIFFERENT TASKS
File types Normal state Encrypted state
.txt 4.62 7.98
.log 4.76 7.83
.conf 4.47 7.92
.pgn 7.91 8.00
.jpeg 7.94 8.00
.pptx 7.94 8.00
.mp3 7.95 8.00
TABLE II. FILE ENTROPY OF DIFFERENT FILES IN NORMAL STATE AND ENCRYPTED STATE
4) Check Read/Write Frequency: The final checkpoint con-
cerns read/write frequency on the local host. Once a read or write
operation is monitored by inotify, the event handler will record
the time it occurred, as shown in Figure 3. What is more, the
redundant contents in time list will be removed at the beginning
of the new thread so that only the read and write operations that
occurred after {read, write} pattern will be recorded in time list.
Since we ran a new thread for further diagnosis, event handler
can continue to record the time of upcoming read and write
operations. With the recorded information in time list, we can
calculate read/write frequency in the system after the anomalous
pattern is found, which is defined as the average number of
read/write operations occurred per second:
read/write frequency =
operation counts
duration
, (2)
where ”operation counts” represents the total number of recorded
read and write operations after an anomalous read/write pattern,
”duration” represents the time interval between the first recorded
operation time and the last one in time list. We can achieve the
value of ”operation counts” by counting the number of elements
in time list and calculate ”duration” by computing the difference
between the first and the last element in time list.
To distinguish normal read/write frequency with anomalous
read/write frequency caused by ransomware activities, we did
two experiments that respectively tests the read/write frequency
during simulative ransomware activities and user normal behav-
iors.
In the first experiment, we use AES ciphers and RSA cipher
from openssl library to encrypt files whose sizes range from 1KB
to 1MB. As for each test, given cipher type and file size, encrypt
100 files automatically. Table III shows the experiment results.
When the file size is specified, the read/write frequency hardly
changes with different ciphers applied. When the cipher type is
decided, larger files tend to cause larger read/write frequency.
When we use RSA cipher, it can only encrypt small files due to
the limitation of its encryption key length in openssl library, so,
we did not get test results for relatively large files when RSA
is applied. However, it does not matter because in real-world
ransomware, RSA is always used to encrypt keys whose length is
relatively small. In the tests, we also observed the number of read
and write operations occurred during file encryption tasks. By
analyzing the data in Table III, we found the read/write frequency
on a system undergoing ransomware attack should be over 600
operations per second. Even if the ransomware is encrypting files
smaller than 1 KB, the read/write frequency could not be smaller
than 600 op/sec. The reason is that, when the file size is 1 KB,
there are totally 200 read and write operations happened on 100
files. That is to say, there is only one read and one write operation
during the encryption of one file. So, when ransomware works
on files that are smaller than 1 KB, the number of read/write
operations will not change whereas the time consumption can
be smaller than that of encrypting 1 KB files, which makes
read/write frequency larger than 600 op/sec. Therefore, we can set
the lower bound of the read/write frequency during ransomware
activity to be larger than 600 op/sec.
Then, we use another experiment to test the read/write
frequency during normal user behaviors. Table IV shows the
experiment results. For example, when we use Firefox, the
maximum read/write frequency on this machine is 322 op/sec and
the average read/write frequency is 95 op/sec. When we watch a
video on YouTube, the maximum frequency is 342 op/sec while
the average frequency is only 105 op/sec. We can observe that
the upper bound of read/write frequency during normal user
activities are smaller than 400 op/sec.
Since the upper bound of normal read/write frequency is
lower than 400 op/sec meanwhile the lower bound of anomalous
read/write frequency is higher than 600 op/sec. We picked
the mid number 500 as the threshold. If the current observed
read/write frequency is greater than or equal to 500 op/sec,
the checking result of the third module will be ”anomalous”.
Then, the local detection mechanism can finish its work with an
”anomalous” detection result. Otherwise, since the read/write
frequency is normal, this machine is considered safe.
In summary, the local detection mechanism uses inotify to
keep monitoring the local host and checking read/write patterns.
An anomalous read/write pattern will trigger further diagnosis. If
all features show anomalous checking results, the local detection
mechanism will send an alert to user reporting anomalous state on
this machine and suspicious tasks that are performing anomalous
behaviors. After that, all running tasks on this machine will be
suspended and then the network-level detection will be triggered
to collect information from other machines.
C. Validation of Local Detection Mechanism
As we mentioned in Section 3.1, using one feature alone to
detect ransomware is not sufficient because single feature methods
will cause many false positives and false negatives. For example,
if we use file entropy as the only feature to determine whether
1 KB 10 KB 100 KB 500 KB 1 MB
AES 128 CBC 742 op/sec 1379 op/sec 8318 op/sec 33876 op/sec 43363 op/sec
AES 256 CBC 724 op/sec 1437 op/sec 8642 op/sec 33920 op/sec 43780 op/sec
AES 128 ECB 749 op/sec 1440 op/sec 8758 op/sec 34162 op/sec 43027 op/sec
AES 256 ECB 788 op/sec 1380 op/sec 8546 op/sec 33697 op/sec 43998 op/sec
RSA 651 op/sec - - - -
Op counts 200 400 2600 12400 24600
TABLE III. READ/WRITE FREQUENCY DURING BATCH FILE ENCRYPTION.
Applications Max Frequency Average Frequency
Firefox 322 op/sec 95 op/sec
Text editor 210 op/sec 88 op/sec
LibreOffice writer 310 op/sec 35 op/sec
YouTube 342 op/sec 105 op/sec
Amazon 281 op/sec 121 op/sec
Gmail 253 op/sec 74 op/sec
TABLE IV. READ/WRITE FREQUENCY DURING NORMAL BEHAVIORS.
a machine is infected, the compressed files will be mistaken for
encrypted files and result in false positives. To validate the service
of our local detection mechanism, we applied it on two machines
under two different scenarios.
In the first scenario, both of these two test machines are safe.
We ran our local detection mechanism on them for two days and
used them as usual such as doing course projects, reading papers,
writing assignments, watching movies, playing computer games
and etc. In the second scenario, we also ran our local detection
mechanism on these two test machines for 2 days, but during
this period, we applied ransomware samples on them at random
time for 48 times and observed detection results.
Table V shows the test results, we can know that there were
3 false positives on Machine1 but no false negative case during
the experiment. That is to say, when the test machines are in
safe state, our local detection mechanism reported ”anomalous”
detection results for three times on Machine1. When the test
machines are under the risk of ransomware attacks, all attacks
were correctly detected and reported by our local detection
mechanism. We also found the reason for these 3 false positives.
They are caused by file encryption behaviors performed by
authorized users.
Sometime, although there is no ransomware attack, users’
ransomware-like behaviors will cause false positives. That’s why
we need network-level detection to help us correct some false
positives of local detection and to provide users with more
accurate information to judge whether there is a ransomware
attack indeed.
V. NETWORK-LEVEL DETECTION
The network-level detection works on collecting security
conditions of other machines from network and generating a
comprehensive report to help user determine whether there exists
ransomware attack. It can help correct some false positives made
by local detection and it enjoys excellent functionality especially
when there is a cryptoworm attack.
The general idea of network-level detection is that, if multiple
machines manifested the similar anomalous behavior at about
the same time, it is likely a cryptoworm attack. If only a few
machines are anomalous, these machines may be misdiagnosed
by local detection because cryptoworm spreads swiftly, causing
a mass of infected machines. It is easy to know the number of
anomalous machines in LAN by collecting information from all
the peers. However, this idea is hard to be put into practice in
WAN because it is difficult to efficiently collect useful information.
If we query all machines in WAN for their security conditions,
it will be time and network-resource consuming. If we only pick
several machines as representatives, their information may not
be reliable because a few machines information cannot reveal the
condition of the entire WAN. To solve this dilemma, our solution
is to apply the ACO algorithm to the network-level detection so
that we can more efficiently collect the most useful information
in the least time.
To sum up, we use ACO-based Mechanism (ACOM) to
collect information from selected machines in WAN and use
Broadcasting Mechanism (BM) to collect information from all
machines in the same LAN. Then, we can use wisdom of the
crowd to provide user with collected data for reference and help
user determine whether to treat this machine as an infected one
or not.
A. ACO-based Mechanism
1) Ant Colony Optimization: Ant colony optimization (ACO)
is an optimization technique inspired by the path finding behav-
iors of ants searching for food [7]. In nature, ants use pheromone
to communicate with each other. They left pheromone along
with the path they find food so that other ants can also find
food following the pheromone trails. When there are multiple
pheromone paths ahead, ants make decision depending on the
strength of pheromone trails. Most ants choose the strongest
pheromone trial and only a small number of ants choose other
ways. Over time, pheromone trails will gradually evaporate. This
means that pheromone trails which no longer lead to a food
source will eventually stop being used, promoting ants to find
new paths and new food sources. Figure 4 gives an example of
how ants searching for food.
Fig. 4. Path finding behavior of ants searching for food.
Suppose the food resource is on the left side and the ant
colony is on the right side. There are two paths between food
Machine Number of false positives Number of false negatives
Machine1 3 0
Machine2 0 0
TABLE V. FALSE POSITIVES AND FALSE NEGATIVES CAUSED BY LOCAL DETECTION MECHANISM
resource and ant colony. Path A has shorter distance while path
B has longer distance. At the very beginning, both paths may be
chosen by ants from the ant colony and pheromone trails are left
on both paths. Since path A has shorter distance, the ants on path
A spend less time to go and back which makes the pheromone
trails on this path stronger than that on path B. The stronger
pheromone trail on path A will attract more ants to this path.
Overtime, almost all ants choose path A instead of path B. That
is a process how ants find the shortest path between two places.
So, ACO algorithm is always applied to optimization problems
such as travelling salesman problem and various scheduling and
routing problems. It has also been applied to detect network
intrusions and Botnet servers [14].
Our problem is similar to travelling salesman problem.
Instead of finding the shortest way to go through all cities, we
want to find the shortest way to collect most information from
other machines in WAN. So, we used ACO algorithm to help
us do network-level detection in WAN scenario so that we can
provide user with a helpful report without consuming too much
network resources.
2) Design of ACOM: There are two key elements in ACO:
ants and pheromone. To apply ACO to the network-level detec-
tion, we should first decide what roles these two elements should
play in our approach. Since we want to collect most information
from other machines in WAN, we use ants to collect and transmit
information among machines just as what they do when searching
for food. Each anomalous machine creates an ant and sends it to
the network. Each time an ant passes an anomalous machine, it
records the security condition of this machine in it and share the
information it has collected with the next machine it reaches. We
consider pheromone as the number of anomalous machines each
ant has collected, and it can be left on the machines that the ant
passed. In this manner, as ants travel in WAN, machines can have
increasing knowledge of the number of anomalous machines in
WAN.
Then, according to the records in an ant when it finishes its
work and the level of pheromone left on the machine, ACOM will
generate a report telling user current situation in WAN. Figure
5 shows the pseudo code of ACOM, which describes the work
procedure of this network-level detection mechanism.
Once ACOM is launched, the anomalous local host creates an
ant and then sends this ant to network. The next destination of
the ant should be randomly selected from all machines this local
host can contact with. Then, ACOM goes into a while loop. In
this loop, the ant firstly notifies the current local host to do local
detection again if this local host is not doing local detection. Then
they exchange information with each other. The local host here
indicates the machine that an ant is currently on. For example, we
say machine A created an ant and sent it to machine B, the event
exchange information happens between the ant and machine B.
After information exchange, ACOM checks if the ant has achieved
its goal which is the number of anomalous machines it needs
to collect during its travel. If the ant has collected sufficient
anomalous machines indicating a cryptoworm attack, it will go
back to the original machine that created this ant and report to
the user saying that ”At least T users in WAN think you are in
high risk”. Here, T should be replaced by the value of threshold
determined in different network environments. If the ant has not
achieved goal but has reached the upper bound of its capability,
Fig. 5. Pseudo code describing the work procedure of ACOM.
it will go back as well but report that ”We inquired 20 users
in WAN, only A user(s) think(s) your are in risk.” A should be
replaced by the number of anomalous machines known by the
ant. Both of the above two cases lead to the end of ACOM since it
finished to provide user with wisdom of the crowd for reference.
Otherwise, the ant should continue to work. The current local
host it is on should decide the next stop of the ant according
to pheromone information and send the ant to the next stop.
The work procedure in the while loop iterates until the ant goes
back to its original local host and reports our judgement. This
is the entire workflow of ACOM. The detailed implementation of
ACOM will be illustrated in the following subsection.
3) Implementation of ACOM: In the workflow of ACOM,
there are three important functions: CreateAnt(), ExchangeIn-
formation(), and DecideDirection(). The details of these three
functions are explained below.
Key Function 1: CreateAnt()
Ants are used to help the anomalous machines collect secu-
rity condition information of other machines from network. In
ACOM, anomalous machines create their own ants and send them
to network to collect information of other machines. When a local
host creates an ant, it needs to tell the ant three main things:
goal, home, and (upper) limit.
From a global perspective, we need to set a threshold T to
determine the upper bound of number of anomalous machines
in a safe scenario. That is to say, if ACOM on one anomalous
machine can obtain information of more than T anomalous
machines from WAN, it will alert user to potential high risk.
If ACOM finds less than T anomalous machines from WAN,
it concludes there is no cryptoworm attack and reports its
judgement to user. An ant’s goal is related to the threshold T.
It is defined as the number of anomalous machines that the ant
needs to collect during its travel. Let the value of goal be G,
G = T − P ′. (3)
In equation (3), P’ indicates the number of anomalous machines
known to the local host that created the ant, and it is treated
as the pheromone level. We will explain more details about
pheromone in the next function ExchangeInformation(). The
value of goal equals to the difference between threshold and
pheromone because before a specific ant is created, some other
ants may have travelled through this local host and deposit
information about other anomalous machines observed during
their traversals. As such, leveraging such information, this new
ant will not need to start from scratch to reach the threshold.
If the ant can find G anomalous machines from WAN, we think
this machine is probably infected by cryptoworm. Otherwise, we
report this machine is probably not infected. That is, ACOM will
report our judgement according to ant’s detection results.
The second thing the local host needs to tell the created ant
is the home address. Home address is the IP address of this local
host. With this address information, the ant could return and
report detection results when it finishes its work.
The system parameter limit stipulates that each ant can only
travel through at most N machines. We set this limitation because
we do not want the ant to go through so many machines that
consumes a great amount of time and network resources.
Key Function 2: ExchangeInformation()
As an ant arrives at a new machine, it exchanges information
with the current local host so that both the ant and the current
local host can enrich their knowledge about security condition
in WAN. On one hand, ant tells local host a list contains all
anomalous machines it has collected up to now as well as the
count of anomalous machines which is considered as pheromone.
This process is to mimic the behavior of ants in nature that leave
pheromone trails on their way to food resources. On the other
hand, local host tells ant its local detection result: whether it
is anomalous or not. So, after exchanging information, ant may
collect one more record while local host receives pheromone.
We also mimicked the property of pheromone that, it evapo-
rates over time. We use this property because the machines do not
need to keep very old information on them since the conditions
of other machines in WAN may change over time. In our model,
pheromone value remains unchanged in the first 10 seconds after
it reaches the local host. Then, it decreases at a rate of 10% per
second. Suppose the original amount of pheromone is p, we can
calculate pheromone p left on some machine after t seconds using
this formula:
p′(t) =
⌊
0.9t−10 ∗ p
⌋
, t ≥ 10. (4)
Review the goal of each ant in function CreateAnt(), the value of
p’ we can achieve in equation (4) should be used as the variable
p’ in the equation (3) to calculate the goal of each ant when being
created.
After exchanging information, the ant can decide whether it
should go back home and report its detection result. If it has not
finished its work, the local host should help ant decide direction,
that is, which machine to go as the next stop.
Key Function 3: DecideDirection()
In nature, ants decide their directions depending on the
strength of pheromone trails ahead; In ACOM, the next des-
tination of an ant is also decided depending on pheromone
information left on the current local host. Since we want the ant
to achieve its goal in shorter time if there exist some anomalous
machines in WAN, the optimal direction of the ant should be an
anomalous machine so that it can finish its work earlier.
To help an ant choose the next stop according to pheromone
information on the current local host, our strategy is to assign
weights to other machines that the current local host can contact
with. Since the local host has pheromone information left by
all passed ants, it has already known some anomalous machines
in WAN. So, it should assign larger weights to these already
known anomalous machines just like the already known shorter
paths in nature having stronger pheromone trails. It assigns
smaller weights to unknown machines just like uncertain paths
to food sources in nature having weaker pheromone trails. In our
implementation, the larger weights are set to 2 while the smaller
weights are set to 1 to simply distinguish known anomalous
machines and unknown machines. The stops which an ant has
previously passed are assigned with weight 0 because the ant does
not need to go back to the previous stops to gather information.
With weights set, current local host can calculate the possibil-
ity of each machine to be chosen as the next stop. The anomalous
machines which have larger weights are more likely to be selected
as destination of the ant. Suppose there are totally n machines in
reach, the probability for some machine to be chosen is equal to
the weight of this machine over the total weights of all machines
in reach:
probability(k) =
weight(k)∑n
i=1
weight(i)
, 1 ≤ k ≤ n. (5)
By this way, the next stop of the ant is decided in random
but is not completely in random. The ant is more likely to be
sent to an anomalous machine so that it can collect sufficient
anomalous machines to prove a risky condition as soon as possible
if there exist cryptoworm attack. Meanwhile, it is also possible
that the ant can go to an undiscovered machine just like an ant in
nature opening up a new path. Thus, we can guarantee that the
information collected by ants are typical enough to conclude the
current situation in network while very limited network resources
and time will be consumed by ACOM.
B. Broadcasting Mechanism
While ACOM is designed for collecting security condition
information from WAN, another network-level detection method
called Broadcasting Mechanism (BM) is especially designed for
detection in LAN. It exhaustively inquiries all machines in LAN
and uses wisdom of the crowd to help user determine whether
the local host is infected. This process does not consume too
much network resource since the number of machines in LAN
is limited, but it provides overall view of security condition in
LAN.
Once BM is launched on a local host, it broadcasts the
anomalous condition of the local host to all other machines in
LAN meanwhile it receives this kind of information from other
anomalous machines so that it can have a general idea about the
number of anomalous machines in LAN at this point. Then, it
generates a comprehensive report to tell user current security
condition in LAN. For example, if there are totally 100 machines
and 80 of them are anomalous, BM will generate a report saying
that ”80% machines in LAN also experience anomalies, so your
computer is in high risk of cryptoworm attack.” Based on the
reports from ACOM and BM, the user can make a judgement
by himself(herself) about whether to treat his(her) computer as
an infected machine.
VI. EVALUATION OF NETWORK-ASSISTED APPROACHES
In this section, we describe how we established a test envi-
ronment in which 100 Docker containers are used to simulate
a real-world network scenario and a Linux ransomware sample
called GonnaCry [8] is applied on simulative infected machines
to evaluate the performances of NAA.
Although NAA is an integrated approach, we compared
the accuracy, message overheads and latency of local detection
mechanism, ACOM and BM to verify whether network-level
detection can improve local detection and to verify applicability
of ACOM and BM in different scenarios. To distinguish the
local detection mechanism used by ACOM and BM with the
mechanism itself when treated as an independent mechanism, we
name the independent local detection mechanism Direct Report
(DR). In the rest of this section, we will compare DR, ACOM and
BM to have an comprehensive evaluation about the performance
of each part of NAA. Note that, DR directly uses the detection
result of local detection mechanism as the final result; ACOM is
supported by the local detection mechanism and further uses the
ACO algorithm to perform network-level detection to achieve
a final report; BM also uses the local detection mechanism
as a baseline and then collects information of all machines in
simulative network to make a final report according to the
number of anomalous machines.
A. Experiment Environment
Docker is a platform that provides resources and services for
application development and test. It uses OS-level virtualization to
deliver software in packages called containers. Containers can be
considered as simplified virtual machines because each container
has its own configuration files and libraries but is run by a
single operating system kernel which results in fewer resources
demands. Containers can communicate with each other through
well-defined channels as well as maintaining isolated from one
another. So, we use Docker containers to simulate the real-world
network scenario instead of using virtual machines due to the
functionality and simplification of containers. In our experiment,
we established 100 containers, each of which is equipped with DR,
ACOM and BM, to simulate a network environment containing
100 machines which can communicate with each other when
it is needed. When testing a specific mechanism, we run this
mechanism on all 100 containers for 10 times and observe its
average performances.
To simulate the scenarios that some specified machines are
attacked by ransomware, we run a Linux ransomware sample
called GonnaCry on these specified containers and then execute
a detection mechanism on each container to test its performances
in this situation. GonnaCry employs a hybrid scheme which is
utilized by most real-world ransomware nowadays combining
asymmetric encryption and symmetric encryption together. To
make the ransomware more secure from the attacker’s perspec-
tive, GonnaCry contacts a remote server which keeps a pair
of RSA keys for it, although the ransomware itself also has its
own RSA key pair so that the victims cannot get the decryption
key directly from their local hosts. The working procedure of
GonnaCry is as following: The remote server generates a pair of
RSA keys. The public key S pub is hardcoded in GonnaCry while
the private key S priv is preserved on the remote server. When
GonnaCry starts to work, it generates its own RSA key pair on
the local host. The public key is called C pub and the private
key is called C priv. Then, it uses AES cipher to encrypt the
local private key C priv with the servers public key S pub and
also uses AES cipher to encrypt target files with local public key
C pub. In this case, if someone wants to recover these encrypted
files, he/she needs to get the servers private key S priv first to
recover the local private key C priv so that he/she can use C priv
to decrypt files. Since the servers private key S priv is stored on
the remote server, the victim has to pay the ransom to obtain this
key. We apply GonnaCry on simulative infected machines due to
its realism.
We respectively simulated 11 different scenarios with increas-
ing numbers of infected machines and decreasing numbers of
safe machines while the total number is always 100. In each
scenario, we respectively apply three different mechanisms on
containers and test 10 times to achieve reasonable average results
of accuracy, message overhead and latency.
To determine the value of limit N and threshold T, we tried
many different values under this 100-machine scenario. Finally,
we decided that N = 20 and T = 3 because this setting contributes
a best balance between accuracy and efficiency which considers
both time consumption and network resource consumption.
B. Accuracy
Accuracy is defined as the correctly reported cases out of
overall cases, that is, accuracy = (true positives + true negatives)
/ (true positives + false positives + true negatives + false negatives).
Since BM just reports the fact it observed using wisdom of the
crowd instead of reporting its own judgement, we only evaluate
the accuracy of DR and ACOM. The result is shown in Figure 6,
the x-axis represents the number of infected machines, the y-axis
indicates accuracy of DR and ACOM.
Fig. 6. Accuracy Comparison of ACOM and DR
We can observe that ACOM has greater advantage over DR
when there are only a few infected machines. As the number
of infected machines increases, although ACOM does not have
evident superiority, it is still more accurate than DR in most
cases. This test result proves that the network-level detection can
help improve accuracy of local detection. Plus the comprehensive
report from BM, user can make an even more precise decision
about whether the local host is attacked by ransomware. If the
ransomware is a cryptoworm, it can be detected at very beginning
if NAA is deployed due to high accuracy of ACOM at the time
that only a few machines are infected.
C. Message Overheads
Message overhead is another important factor in considera-
tion since we do not want to cause too much network resource
consumption during the process of ransomware detection. If a
ransomware detection approach produces huge resource con-
sumption which is heavier than the damage of ransomware
itself, it should not be put into practice. It is obvious that
these three mechanisms we put forward will not cause huge
resource consumption compared with the expensive extortion fee
of ransomware, but we still want to figure out their message
overhead to see which mechanism is optimal from this aspect.
We define message overhead as the extra messages produced
by ransomware detection approaches. In ACOM, machines need
to send and receive ants during the detection process. In BM,
machines need to send and receive news about whether a specific
machine is anomalous or not. So, both ACOM and BM produce
extra messages when they are running. Figure 7 shows the
message overhead of Dr, BM and ACOM. The x-axis indicates the
number of infected machines and the y-axis indicates the number
of messages being produced during each detection process.
Fig. 7. Message overhead of three mechanisms.
We can observe that DR performs best when coming across
message overhead measurement because it directly uses the
detection results of local detection mechanism which does not
produce any additional messages. BM produces more message
overheads than ACOM does in most cases. As the number
of infected machines increases, the message overhead of BM
drastically grows while that of ACOM slightly grows. The reason
is that, BM requires each anomalous machine to send messages to
all peers while ACOM only allows each ant to go through at most
20 machines. Thus, apply BM to LAN scenario is a reasonable
arrangement from message overhead’s perspective since there are
limited machines in LAN making the message overhead of BM
countable.
D. Latency
Latency is the time duration that each mechanism needs
to complete its task. We calculated the average latency on all
machines in each test. Figure 8 shows the latency of DR, BM
and ACOM. The x-axis indicates the number of infected machines
and the y-axis indicates the average seconds that each mechanism
consumes during its work.
Fig. 8. Latency of three mechanisms.
As for DR, its latency is approximately 0 because it only does
local detection which can be completed in very short time. As for
BM, no matter how many victims exist, the anomalous machines
always broadcast a message and receive messages from other
anomalous peers and then a report is sent to user depending
on the number of anomalous machines in LAN. All machines
work in parallel following the above procedure, which makes
the runtime of all machines be similar to the runtime of one
randomly picked machine. So, the average latency of BM only has
a little fluctuation as the number of infected machines increases.
As for ACOM, each anomalous machine creates an ant that goes
through at least 3 machines one after one. As the number of
infected machines increases, more ants will be created which
makes average runtime increase. So, ACOM has the worst latency
among three integrated approaches while Direct Report almost
has no latency. However, the high latency of ACOM does not do
extra damage to infected machines because all suspicious tasks
are suspended before ACOM is launched so that ransomware
cannot encrypt files when network-level detection is working.
E. Loss Assessment
In this section, we estimated the damages that a ransomware
can cause on a machine before it is detected by our ransomware
detection approach NAA. That is, how many files can be en-
crypted before the ransomware is detected and terminated.
We can learn from the test results shown above that ACOM
has relatively long delay before reporting our diagnosis to user.
However, it does not result in additional damage because before
ACOM is launched, all suspicious tasks are suspended until user
takes further actions. So, the number of files being encrypted
during the process of local detection is exactly the losses of this
machine. Figure 9 shows the average number of encrypted files
on a victim machine if NAA is applied on. The x-axis is the
number of infected machines in LAN, the y-axis is the average
number of encrypted files.
Fig. 9. Average number of encrypted files.
We can observe that no matter how many machines are
infected, the number of encrypted files on each machine ranges
from 15 to 30, which is acceptable loss owe to the quick job of
our local detection mechanism.
Based on our evaluation results concerning accuracy, message
overheads, latency and loss assessment, we find that network-
level detection can indeed help improve the accuracy of local
detection. From message overhead’s point of view, ACOM is
applicable to WAN scenario while BM is applicable to LAN
scenario for network-level detection. Moreover, NAA provides
good performance especially for detecting cryptoworm attack
since our network-level detection can provide user with very
accurate alert in the early stage of cryptoworm attack.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we propose a network-assisted approach called
NAA for ransomware detection which combines local detection
and network-level detection together. We first describe a local
detection mechanism which uses three local features to judgement
whether the local host is anomalous. In network-level detection,
we implement ACOM to efficiently collect information in WAN
scenario and put forward BM which exhaustively inquires all
machines in LAN. Then, the network-level detection uses wisdom
of the crowd to provide user with a comprehensive report so that
user can easily make his(her) judgement based on the information
we offered. To evaluate our approach, we use docker to establish
the experiment environment and use GonnaCry to simulate
ransomware attack. The test results show that NAA is more
accurate than local only detection and is especially applicable
for cryptoworm detection meanwhile the loss of files during the
working procedure of NAA is acceptable.
However, due to the limited resource of Linux ransomware
sample, we only used GonnaCry to simulate ransomware attack
in our evaluation experiments. In the future, we will test the per-
formance of NAA using some other Linux ransomware samples
especially Linux cryptoworm samples when they are accessible.
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